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What Men Want to Know About the Ethics 
of Women 
William L. Blizek 
With the publication in 1 982 of Carol Gilligan's book, In A Differenc 
Voice, at least some people began to ask whether or not there are 
moral differences between women and men.1 The very prospect of 
moral differences between the sexes seems preposterous, of course, 
just because morality is generally regarded as something that applies at 
least to all members of the species.Nevertheless, Gilligan noticed that 
developmental differences between women and men seemed to gener­
ate a corresponding difference in moral perspective. That is, when 
faced with moral problems, women talk about these problems in a 
significantly different way than do men.2 Women ask different ques­
tions, raise different issues, and give different reasons for why we 
should behave in one way rather than another. Women speak about 
moral problems, to use Gilligan's title, in a different ooice. 
Whether we accept the conclusion that women have a different 
perspective on moral problems will depend in pare upon the evidence. 
Gilligan has provided some evidence in the voices of the women she 
has interviewed for her studies. Further formal research will confirm 
or disconfirm the conclusion. We can, of course, seek our own evi­
dence by listening carefully to women as they talk about moral 
problems. 
But the issue is not just a matter of evidence. It is also a matter of 
meaning. What does it mean to say that women have a different pers­
pective on moral problems? Can we give meaning to such a claim 
within our usual understanding of morality? Or, will we be required 
to change how we view the very nature of morality in order to make 
sense of this conclusion? It is the question of meaning that I wish to 
address in the following remarks. 
Before turning to our consideration of meaning, however, I must 
identify a second conclusion drawn by Carol Gilligan. The moral 
perspective of women, while different from that of men, is not infe, 
rior to the perspective of men. One of the most prominent accounts 
of moral development, that of Lawrence Kohlberg, shows that the 
moral development of women is inferior to that of men.3 That is, as 
measured by Kohlberg's standards, women generally reach only the 
third stage of his six,stage sequence. "At this stage morality is con, 
ceived in interpersonal terms and goodness is equated with helping 
and pleasing others. ,,,. This stage is very different from the highest 
stage of moral development, where relationships are subordinated to 
universal principles of justice. 
Gilligan's response to Kohlberg has been to argue that there is 
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nothing wrong with women, but rather that som�thmg is wrong with a 
standard of moral development that makes roughly one half of the 
species inferior to the other half.� The only way to say that the moral 
perspeaive of women is inferior to that of men 1s to ado('.'t the pers, 
pective of men as the standard of the entire species. But. as long as 
adopting the perspective of men is arbitrary, the claim that women are 
morally inferior is also arbitrary.6 
Whatever meaning we can give Gilligan's conclusion about the dif, 
ference in moral perspective will also have to take into account the 
claim that the perspective of women is not inferior to that of men.' 
These two conclusions taken together set the stage for understanding 
the nature of morality by raising the issue of relativism. If the perspec, 
tive of women is different from but equal to that of men, we are faced 
with a fundamental relativism in ethics. While the ethics of women 
may be relativistic in some respects, the question of special concern 
here is whether the very nature of ethics is relativistic. If we believe 
that ethics is not fundamentally relative in nature, then we will be 
faced with the task of showing that the ethics of women is superior to 
the ethics of men, since Gilligan claims they are not inferior and 
equality generates relativism. My own suspicion is that we can show 
the ethics of women to be superior to traditional masculine ethics, 
given a particular interpretation of the ethics of women and given a 
particular understanding of how to justify one ethical theory over 
others. 
Before turning to the meaning of Gilligan's claims, let me say why I 
refer to the questions of meaning as "what men want to know about 
the ethics of women." first, in my experiences, the questions of 
meaning are the questions that men, but not women, actually do ask 
about the suggestion that women have a different ethk from men. I 
would qu:alify my claim by saying that men in general simply are not 
interested in the question at all. So the men who ask questions of 
meaning are philosophers who have spent much of their lives asking 
just this kind of question. Women in general, by contrast, do find the 
suggestion of a different moral perspective interesting. But the ques, 
tions that women ask, i ncluding women who are philosophers, are 
questions of a more concrete nature. What do women actually say 
about particular moral problems and how does what they say differ 
from what men say? There is, I would note, a remarkable excitement 
and enthusiasm among women when they discover that other women 
are speaking in the same voice as they themselves and that it is accep, 
table to speak in this voice. 
Second, the questions of meaning which I intend to examine have 
an abstract or theoretical character about them, rather than a con, 
crete, immediate, and practical character. This difference in character 
matches roughly a distinction that is often made between women and 
men regarding intuition and logic. This commonly perceived differ, 
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ence is mirrored in the kinds of quesci ns that men and ,,. men actu­
allv do ask about the ethics of women. Men are seen as 1 gical and 
rh�refore as formal in rheir approach to the world. W men are m­
monly seen as intuiti\·e and therefore as nrextual in their appr a.ch. 
It ma\· be said thar the questions of meaning are the wr ng ques­
tions ro ask about the ethics of women. That is. by answering thes,e 
questions we will get the wrong picture of the ethics of women, or at 
least a misleading picture. I do believe that we must be areful in ask­
ing the questions of meaning, careful not to distort the \"Oice of 
women. But I aiso believe that this is only one way to understand 1the 
ethics of women, although I would claim that it is a requirement for a 
complete understanding. I also see the questions of meaning as val ua­
ble to our understanding because I think that our understanding of 
anything is enhanced by a dialectic between the formal and the con­
crete, the immediate and the abstract, the theoretical and the practical. 
I 
The task before us is a large one and I propose to narrow its scope by 
focusing upon three possible interpretations of Gilligan's claims. The 
first interpretation is this: to say that women have a di fferent perspec­
tive on moral problems means that women have different values from 
men. Since their values are different, women will talk about moral 
problems differently-take into account features of the problem that 
men would ignore, emphasize different aspects of the problem, and so 
on.This difference in values can be established by empirical research. 
lts source may be either biological or cultural (or some combination 
of these). Wlhat counts is that women do value different things than 
men value. And, the fact that women value different things does not 
in any way make them inferior to men. We can not introduce some 
larger framework or standard of comparison that makes the values of 
women inferior. 
The result of this difference in values is not only that women speak 
differently about moral problems, but also that women must be 
treated differently in moral situations. The same set of circumstances 
will call for women to be treated differently. If, for example, we adopt 
happiness as our moral standard, then in the same set of circumstan­
ces we will be required to treat a woman differently because different 
things will bring happiness to a woman than to a man. ( I  am assuming 
here that achieving or obtaining what you value brings happiness.) 
This interpretation seems to me to be very much like the case in 
which I ask myself how l should treat each of my daughters. One 
enjoys playing the piano, the other enjoys playing the violin. Neither 
enjoyment is inferior to the other. In some variety of circumstances 
this difference in value will determine a different treatment for each 
child as the appropriate moral choice. And this seems to be very 
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much like the first interpretation of Gilligan's claims. Women want 
different things, value different things, in the context of a moral prob­
lem, and we will be required to neat women differently in order that 
what they value is achieved. The only difference between the case of 
women and the case of ithe children is that in the former case the dif­
ference in values is not an individual matter but rather a matter of 
gender. 
So far we have discussed this interpretation in the abstract. But, 
consider what Gilligan suggests as a significant difference between 
women and men-the value of relationship. Women value being in 
relationship in a way that men do not. This is because women define 
themselves as connected with other persons. They see themselves as 
belonging to a network of relationships. Men, however, identify 
themselves as independent or autonomous. Separation and individua­
tion are more importan1t to the development of a masculine identity 
than the attachment and connection which are crucial to being a 
woman.7 
However one might articu late this difference in detail, roughly 
speaking, women find being in relationship valuable in a way that men 
do not and this value w!ill need to be taken into account in the resolu­
tion of moral problems. Since relationship is not a value for men, 
men will find it difficult to give relationship its due in their moral 
deliberations. It is not just the case that women will identify relation­
ship as an important ingredient in moral problems, but also that men 
must take this value into consideration if they are to resolve moral 
problems correctly. Women cannot be treated as though they were 
independent and separated persons without violating their values and 
treating them wrongly. Nor can we treat men as though they valued 
relationship without violating the value they place on independence 
and autonomy. My hope here is to have given an example of a signifi­
cant and recognizable difference in values that would determine dif­
ferent outcomes of our moral deliberations. 
We are now in a position to evaluate this interpretation of Gilli­
gan's claims. First, it does seem to meet the criterion of difference in 
perspective and no inferiority. To say that women have different 
values than men do is to establish a different perspective on moral 
problems. And, unless there is some convincing reason for claiming 
the contrary, the fact that women value relationship i n  a way that men 
value autonomy or independence does not make women inferior to 
men, nor does it make the value of relationship inferior to the value 
of autonomy.8 
Second, this interpretation tells us that ethics is a relative matter 
but not at the fundamental level of moral theory. That is, we must 
treat women differently than we treat men, but this is because women 
are different from men and not because women have a different ethi­
cal standard or theory than men have. The moral standard of happi-
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ness. for example. is not different for women than for men on this 
interpretation. It is just the case that women will achieve happiness in 
different ways than men do-ways that involve relatio'nship rather 
than autonomy. This kind of relativism is like the relativism that 
occurs when I arrange violin lessons for one dau�hter and piano les­
sons for the other. This is the relativism of context and contextual 
relativism enters all of our moral deliberations. regardless of moral 
standard, unless we adopt a moral standard that has no concern for 
consequences. 
Third, if I am correct about the relativism suggested by the first 
interpretation. we may be required to abandon ethical theories which 
are not consequentialist in nature. That is, any moral standard which 
insists that X is the right thing to do regardless of consequences or 
context, will discriminate against women ( or men) or, at least, may do 
so. Any absolute morality will be rejected because it is not able to 
accommodate the variety of moral situations which we face--or it 
does accommodate them, but by doing great harm to some persons. 
Under the right circumstances those to whom great harm will come 
will be women. This problem is not the result of women having dif­
ferent values from men, it is a problem that results from different per­
sons having different values. But the relativism suggested by Gilligan's 
claims (at least our first interpretation of them) raises in a similar way 
this problem for absolute moral standards .. 
Fourth, the relativism suggested by this interpretation does not 
affect consequentialist moral theories. That is, any number of conse­
quentialist theories can accommodate the difference in values between 
women and men suggested by the first interpretation. This means ithat 
the discovery of different values will not change our account of the 
nature of moral theory-at least consequentialist theory. 
While this interpretation will not change our understanding of 
moral theory, except to point out a deficiency in absolute moral 
standards, we cannot ignore its impact on moral practice. It seems to 
me that men in their moral deliberations regularly ignore or under­
value the importance of relationship to women.The right action is dif­
ferent when relationship is seen as important and women will be seen 
as acting wrongly for emphasizing relationship and will be disvalued 
for acting wrongly. If we are to treat others correctly, from the pers­
pective of any moral theory, we will be required to understand others 
well. Understanding women fully (a prerequisite for correct moral 
judgments) will require recognizing the value that they place upon, for 
example, relationship.9 
Finally, the first interpretation depends upon there actually being a 
difference between the values of women and men. My suspicion is 
that at some very fundamental level women and men share a common 
set of values. Roughly speaking these values include some combina­
tion of relationship and autonomy. It may be appropriiate to talk of 
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these as ideal values, that is, values which when adopted or imple, 
mented generate a healthy and happy existence for the individual per, 
son. "Wouldn't it be better," we might ask, "if women were less 
dependent and men more connected ?" This kind of value is not con, 
ducive to empirical research and may be ignored in tihe effort to col, 
lect data that we can use to demonstrate our conclusions. This in no 
way dimin ishes the values that people perceive themselves to have and 
the importance of those values in our moral deliberations. But how 
people are at the moment is not the full picture of our human nature 
and our understanding of morality. 
II 
We can now turn to a second interpretation of Gilligan's claims. 
According to this interpretation, to say that women have a different 
perspective on moral problems means that women have insights into 
moral problems that men do not have. On this interpretation, con, 
trary to the first, women and men may have the same values, but dif, 
ferences between women and men give women an ability to see fea­
tures of moral situations that men cannot see or, at least, do not often 
recognize. 
What Gilligan suggests as a possible di.fference is the ability of 
women to recognize the needs of others or an ability to empathize 
with others. Quoting from Nancy Chadorow's The Reproduction of 
Mothering, Gilligan claims that girls emerge from their early experien, 
ces of individuation and relationship "with a basis for 'empathy' built 
into their primary definition of self in a way that boys do not." And, 
"Girls emerge with a stronger basis for experiencing another's needs 
or feelings as one's own. "IO 
At chis point permit me to propose a further difference between 
women and men as they discuss moral problems. This difference may 
be seen as separate from empathy, but it might also be seen as a 
further explanation of empathy. When I listen to women and men 
talk about moral issues in ordinary discourse it seems to me that 
women recognize a special need of others-the need to be valued. 
Women seem to distinguish between what a person does and wh:at a 
person is. Men seem to equate what someone is with what he or she 
does. 
In much of the literature on parenting we are told to say to our 
children: " l  like you, but I do not like your behavior or I do not like 
the way you are treating me." Since women do more parenting than 
men do, it may well be that this distinction is more accessible to 
women than men and not just because of the literature on parenting.1 1 
Even in moral philosophy we distinguish between judgments of action 
and judgments regarding persons. But it seems to me that in the work­
a-day world of men this is a distinction which is lost. It may even be 
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that. when asked. men can distinguish without difficulty between per­
sons and cheir actions. But. in practice it seems to me that men treat 
others as objects in the larger scheme of things. as instruments in 
achieving the "bottom line."1: 
l propose this difference in ability (not just to see a difference but 
also to act on it) because it seems compatible with the talk of Gilligan. 
Chodorow. and others regarding differences between women and men 
and because it seems to me to be a vital distinction. The quality of all 
of our lives would be enhanced greatly if persons regularly valued us 
as persons even if they disvalued our behavior and its consequences. 
While this interpretation is something more than the first (women 
have an ability to empathize that men do not) it is also compatible 
with the first. That is, at one level women may have different values 
from men ( relationship vs. autonomy) and yet share with men a basic 
value (e.g., happiness). And, with regard to happiness, women may be 
better able to recognize what makes others happy. The second inter­
pretation can stand, of course, on its own, but it can also be com­
bined with the first. The possibility of combining these two interpre­
tations suggests to me that the issues we are examining are extremely 
complex and will not lend themselves to easy answers. 
I have considered the uability-to-empathize" interpretation because 
it is a common interpretation. That is, the men to whom I speak want 
to say: "Yes, women see things men do not and therefore it will be 
important for us to listen to women if we are to make correct moral 
decisions because correct decisions will require all of the relevant 
information. But, this really doesn't have anything to do with moral 
theory. Suppose that we are all utilitarians, seeking the greatest happi­
ness of the greatest number. All that this talk about a different voice 
means is that women are better utilitarians than men because they see 
consequences that men do not. This may be very important, but it 
does not change at all our understanding of morality nor does it cause 
us to adopt a different moral theory." Now, I do not want to diminish 
the importance of the second interpretation, but I do want to say that 
it can be used to avoid other possibilities and it can be used to dimin­
ish the value of this different voice-nit's just utilitarianism." 
We are now in a position to evaluate the ability-to-empathize inter­
pretation. First, it does meet the criteria established by Gilligan's 
claims. The ability to see different features of moral problems does 
give women a different perspective on moral problems. As well, there 
is nothing in this difference to suggest that women are inferior or that 
their perspective is inferior. It is difficult to imagine how seeing more 
clearly could generate inferiority. Indeed, other things being equal the 
added insights that women bring to moral problems gives them a 
superiority over men. 
Second, this interpretation does not generate relativism at a funda­
mental level. That is, if women have different insights into moral 
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problems this difference is compatible with women anJ mt>n having 
the same moral standard or theory. The problem of relativism 
becomes problematic if the ethics of women are incompatible with the 
ethics of men but neither ethics is inferior to the other. This problem 
does not arise for the second interpretation. This means that the 
second interpretation will not challenge the absolute rule theories that 
the first interpretation did challenge. 
Finally, the ability-to-empathize interpretation does offer us a spe­
cial skill, a skill required of us if we are to make correct moral judg­
ments (not by accident). To be moral persons will mean at least 
developing this skill. If this skill is the ability in practice to distinguish 
between persons and their actions, then ir seems to me to be a very 
significant contribution to our practice of mora lity. Indeed, l would 
go so far as to say that this ability may be the most important element 
in our becoming moral persons. 
Ill 
We can now turn to our third interpretation. On this interpretation, 
to say that women have a different perspective on moral problems 
means that women subscribe to a different moral theory or standard. 
This does not mean that women consciously examine moral theories 
and choose one that is different from the one chosen by men, but 
rather that the way in which women talk about moral problems sug­
gests a different moral theory, different from traditional deontological 
and utilitarian moral theories. 
But in addition, if we are to meet the criterion established by Gilli­
gan, we must show that the moral theory suggested by the voice of 
women is not inferior to traditional deontological and utilitarian 
standards. The ethics of women cannot be subsumed under tradi­
tional masculine ethics, giving the ethics of men veto power over the 
ethics of women in cases of conflict. It is here that the problem of 
relativism arises at the fundamental level of moral theory, rather than 
moral practice. Before turning to the problem of relativism, however, 
permit me to briefly describe the ethical theory suggested by the way 
in which women talk about moral problems and to contrast it with 
traditional ethical theories. 
I like to refer to the ethics of women, following Ne l Noddings, as 
an ethic of caring.13 That is, in any particular situation, the right 
action is the one that meets the needs of others. Meeting the needs of 
others is, of course, often associated with the image of women in our 
culture. As well, meeting the needs of others finds a significant place 
in the ethical tradition of Christianity, an ethics of love or agape. 
But, there is more to an ethic of caring than just meeting the needs 
of others. The needs of others must be met in the right way, i.e., with 
the right attitude. One way to describe this attitude is to say that one 
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muse meet the needs of others without expecting something in rerurn. 
This is what we commonly think of as unseltl.shness. We can also say 
that we must meet the needs of others because we want to and not 
because we are obligated to. This way of putting things indicates that 
meeting our obligations is one of the things that we do for ourselves 
and not for others. Finally, to meet the needs of others in the right 
way means to do so without hurting ourselves. This way of putting 
things indicates the peculiar character of unselfishness-being unsel­
fish does not mean sacrificing oneself for others, but rather being the 
kind of person that can meet the needs of others without that effort 
being a sacrifice of oneself. Indeed, being unselfish is better seen as arn 
expression of oneself than a sacrifice of oneself. 
If I understand Gilligan's description of the three stages of moral 
development in women correctly, the ftrsc stage is the stage of survival 
in which women act selfishly. The second stage is that of pleasing oth­
ers. In this stage women meet the needs of others, but they do so by 
sacrificing some part of themselves. The third and optimal stage is the 
one in which women meet the needs of others without doing damage 
to themselves. (One of Gilligan's complaints is just that when women 
try to move from stage two to stage three, they are often accused of 
being selfish and discouraged from making moral progress. )  These 
stages of moral development, as described by Gilligan, seem co me to 
support the notion that caring means meeting the needs of others with 
the correct attitude.1 .. 
An ethic of caring, then, is one in which the right action is the one 
that meets the needs of others with the correct attitude, i.e., without 
harming ourselves. In one sense this is a consequentialist moral the· 
ory, because right action is determined by consequences. But, as a 
consequentialist theory it is different from other consequentialist the­
ories in its recognition of the consequences of our attirudes, conse­
quences both for ourselves and for others. 
The attitude that we adopt toward others is often, as far as I can 
tell, more important than whatever else we may do for them. We have 
all had experiences in which someone has done something for us but 
we feel that he or she expects something in return (usually something 
unstated ) or that he or she feels sorry for us or feels superior to us in 
some way. In these cases we are disvalued, and being disvalued is an 
especially painful experience. In some cases our being disvalued is 
obvious, but in other cases it is quite subtle and in some cases it is 
accomplished in the name of our own good. As a species, having value 
is one of the requirements of our existence, wherever we derive that 
value. To lose value, or to be disvalued, is painful because it is an 
attack on our very being. 
The attitudes we adopt are as important for ourselves as for others .. 
It may be that the only way to meet the needs of someone else with­
out hurting ourselves is to change our attitude. If I see myself as hav-
10
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ing to do X with you and you need to do Y with me. then I cannot 
meet your need without harming myself. Bur. I can meet \·our nccJ 
without harming mys.elf if I can come to see mysdf as not having to 
do X. Our attitudes aind how they eff�ct our place in th� world ts a 
significant theme of much existential literature and I heli�,·e that exis­
tential thinkers have something to offer us in understanding this com­
ponent of caring. 
Given this brief account of attitudes and their consequences. it 
seems to me that the ethics of women is an ethic of character. What 
we are as persons is as important to our ethical behavior as our judg­
ments regarding consequences of our actions. Indeed, I think that 
what we are as persons will play an important part i.n determ ining 
what consequences we recognize and how much weight or value is 
given to various consequences. If we are not able to live in a world 
where X is a consequence of our action, then we are likely to deny X 
as a consequence of our action or to mini mize the importance of X .  
For the ethics o f  women, factors like courage and wisdom become 
as important as justice and utility. Without courage and wisdom we 
will simply construct justice or utility to suit our own needs. Talk of 
courage and wisdom reminds us of the ethics of ancient Greece-the 
ethics of virtue. If the ethics of women is like the ethics of ancient 
Greece, then making something of oneself ( becoming virtuous) will be 
as important in our understanding of moral problems as any of the 
other moral deliberations we may make. 
IV 
Permit me here to contrast the ethics of women with traditional deon­
tological moral theories where the rule or principle determines right 
action independently of the consequences of our action. For the ethics 
of women, "a principle never takes precedence over a person.11 That 
is, the needs of persons are always more important than the following 
of a rule or the application of a principle. This is, of course, just why 
women were seen as morally inferior to men on Kohlberg's scale of 
moral development.The ethics of women are interpersonal rather than 
principled. 
One problem with an ethical theory that does not rely on a rule or 
principle is that it seems to be susceptible to relativism. That is, if we 
must appeal to the needs of others in deciding what the right action is, 
what will be right one day will be wrong the next, or what will be 
right for one person will be wrong for another. The only way that we 
can be sure about what is right is to establish a rule or principle that 
tells us in all cases what is right. By contrast, the ethics of women 
seem wishy washy, unclear, uncertain. 
We will examine the question of relativism later, but permit me to 
expand briefly here upon the person/principle distinction. It seems to 
11
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me tthat if principles cannot take precedence O\'er the needs of per­
sons. then we could also say with some confidence that institutions 
cannot take precedence over persons. That is. according to the ethics 
of women we do not act rightly when we promote the institution at 
the expense of any individual. The school can not be more important 
than the student. The law cannot he more important than the people 
it serves. The bottom line of business cannot be profit. it must be 
people. Indeed, women would be unlikely to promote institutions as a 
way of relating to other persons. given the moral perspective of 
caring. 
Of special interest here is the institution of religion. That is. if 
women are not likely to promote institutions, then one of the things 
that follows from this is that women are not likely to promote reli­
gion as an institution. That women have less interest in religion is sug­
gested by Nel Noddings. "Just as the educator.," Noddings says, "who 
is properly fascinated with her subject matter will put it aside tempor­
arily for the sake of the student and his ethical development, so must 
the religious leader put aside the objects, and territories, and poss�s­
sions he cherishes for the saike of the living other. "15  And elsewhere 
she claims, "Only if the church allows and promotes unlimited free­
dom of caring can it be an instrument of ethicality." 16 I point this out 
because women who seem to agree with the view that women must 
resist institutions when they take precedence over persons balk at the 
notion that religion could be one of those institutions. Little examina­
tion of history is needed, however, to show that the institution of 
religion does not necessarily require caring behavior. 
If institutions are suspect from the perspective of caring, I would 
suppose that movements will also be suspect. If this is true, then the 
perspective of women will not permit the women's movement to take 
precedence over persons. I point this out because it seems to me that 
many women find the doctrine or the ideas or the principles or the 
politics of the women's movement to be more important than 
persons. 
v 
We can now contrast the ethics of women to utilitarian moral theor­
ies. This difference seems more difficult to identify than the difference 
between caring and principle. Both caring and utilitarianism are con­
sequentialist theories, and if we claim that the needs of others are to 
be met because greater happiness will result, the ethics of women may 
appear to be a sophisticated version of utilitarianism. Is there a differ­
ence between the ethics of women and utilitarianism? 
In order to show that these are different theories, it seems to me 
that we would need to show that at least in some cases the right action 
for one theory will be different from the right action of the other. 
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Since both of these theories are contextualise in naiture, it is difficult 
to contT'ast them in any simple way, but as an example that may be 
useful let us consider the question of abortion. How would a women 
decide whether or not to have an abortion?1i Actually it might be eas­
ier to deal with the issue from the perspective of an observer and ask 
"Would l advise a woman to have or not have an abortion?" 
Before turning to the difference between an ethic of caring and util­
itarianism, let me note that the question regarding abortion will not 
be determined by a principle. That is, one cannot appeal to a principle 
concerning the right to life, because principles cannot take precedence 
over persons. This is true even if we consider the fetus to be a person. 
Neither the right to life of the mother nor the right to life of the fetus 
can decide the issue because other factors, the needs of persons, must 
be taken into account and may determine a different outcome. Princi­
ples (including rights) cannot take precedence over persons for an 
ethic of caring. 
Returning to the issue of caring and utility, it seems to me that in 
some cases an ethic of caring will say that having an abortion will be 
the right action for a woman and that in these same circumstances an 
ethic of utility will claim that having an abortion is wrong. We can 
imagine. I think, a variety of cases and circumstances in which the 
happiness we might reasonably predict for the life of the child will be 
greater than the unhappiness of the mother . 18 In such cases, on the 
grounds of utility, we will conclude that it is wrong for the woman to 
have an abortion. In some situations with the same utility values (the 
happiness of the child is greater than the unhappiness of the mother),  
it seems to me that an ethic of caring would conclude that having an 
abortion is the right thing to do. How can we understand this 
conclusion? 
One way to understand the conclusi.on that abortion is right even 
where the greater happiness would be achieved by the opposite action 
is by saying that the present takes priority over the future-the actual 
takes precedence over the potential. The " living other," to use Nel 
Noddings's phrase, is to take precedence over the 0potential other." 
This difference (present/future) is not a matter of there being some� 
thing more certain about the present as opposed to the future, as sug� 
gested by Bentham's calculus. The present takes precedence over the 
future, not as a matter of utility, but in spite of utility. Since the 
priority of the present is not a matter of utility, the conclusion drawn 
by the theory will not be utilitarian, even if decisions also include 
some considerations of utility. 
Another way to explain why an ethic of caring would answer the 
question of abortion differently than an ethic of utility is to say that it 
is unfair to inflict unhappiness on the mother in order to generate the 
greater happiness of the child. In other words, an ethic of caring 
would include considerations of justice which are not a part of utilit, 
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ariain theory. This is not to say that an ethic of caring is an ethic of 
justice. For the reasons described above an ethic of caring is incom­
patible with a theory which uses a principle, even a principle of jus­
tice, to determine rightness and wrongness. But an ethic of caring may 
include considerations of justice (as well as considerations of utility). 
Since women are not proposing moral theories-their talk suggests 
a different theory-it is difficult to say which of these explanations 
would be accepted by women. But, this way of describing an ethical 
theory (as including elements of justice and elements of utility) 
reminds me of William Frankena's mixed deontological theory.19 
According to Frankena, on some occasions duty will take precedence 
over consequences and on other occasions consequences will out­
weigh duty. But we do not have any theoretical way of deciding when 
to give priority to duty or to happiness. We will be required, on 
Frankena 's view, to recogni�:e when one consideration overrides the 
other and vice versa. This sounds to me a lot like an intuitionist moral 
theory, one in which the right action is determined by recognizing 
what is right in any given situation, even if justice and utility must be 
considered prior to the recognition of what is right. Since this brief 
account of Frankena 's theory parallels the remarks above about the 
ethics of women, it might be that we would want to characterize the 
ethics of women in a similar fashion. 
Before we turn to another way of distinguishing the ethics of caring 
from both an ethics of principle and an ethics of utility-moral 
rationalism-permit me to make another suggestion regarding the dis­
tinction between caring and utility. Returning to the question of abor­
tion, it seems to me that if a woman asked "What should I do!" my 
response from the perspective of an ethics of caring would be "Do 
your best to meet the needs of others." In this case the primary needs 
would be those of the child. The right thing to do is to do what you 
are able to do. Likewise it would be wrong to do more than you are 
able. We will have to consider carefully what "being able" means, but 
at this point it seems to me that roughly speaking we can understand 
this different perspective. uDo what you can." "Do your best." Is 
there anything more that we can ask of others (or even ourselves)! 
On this view the right thing to do is what you are able to do. The 
wrong thing to do is either less than you are able or more than you 
are able. But what do we mean by "being able?" Again roughly speak­
ing. because I do not know how to be very precise about these mat­
ters, it seems to me that "to do more than one is able" means "to do 
something that is harmful to oneself. uzo This is, I think a repeat of the 
description of unselfishness or genuine caring given above. Another 
way to put this is to say that "being able,, means "being able without 
resentment," where resentment is the sign that one has been harmed 
or that one feels himself or herself to have been harmed. My vision 
here is that it is important to treat others without resentment (with, 
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out feeling that we have been harmed) because our feelings of resent­
ment have a very serious negative effect on others. Our attitudes. I 
contend. generate some of the most important consequences for those 
with whom we interact. Resentment generates alienation and fear and 
the.se consequences may be far more important in the grand scheme of 
our humanity than any of the other consequences of our behaviors. 
If "doing more than one is able" means generating harm to oneself 
or generating resentment, what does it mean to say that someone has 
done less than she or he is able? One way of describing "doing less" is 
in terms of our freedom. We are always free to act differently. But 
freedom is importanc to our present and future behavior and it does 
not apply to the past, except in some abstract sense. This is why 
Freud said that our past behavior is always determined, but that we 
cannot predict future behavior. The abstract case can also be put in 
the following terms. "If 1 had been stronger, or less afraid, or knew 
more about myself, I could have acted differently." We might term 
this .. being able under ideal circumstances." But, since we do n.ot live 
in an ideal world, what can we say about the concrete or practical 
situation? 
It seems to me that we will be required to say that no one can do 
less than his or her best. Everyone is always doing what he or she is 
able to do, no matter how differently they might act in an ideal world 
and no matter how much we would like them to act differently. In the 
practical sense, in the concrete situation, everyone is always acting 
rightly. The vision suggested by this talk is surely antithetical to our 
usual understanding of morality. It suggests a radical departure from 
tradition.al moral theories. Indeed, one might go so far as to say that 
the ethics of women goes beyond morality, beyond rightness and 
wrongness. If we could show this to be the case, I would conclude 
that there are considerations about behavior that are more important 
than moral considerations. 2 1  
This does not mean that ethics, deciding what w e  should do, will be 
without focus. We will have to ask questions about the needs of 
others-both at a general level and at the level of specific individuals 
in specific contexts. We will want to know something about the happ­
iness and unhappiness that might follow from our choice. We may 
also ask about whether our action is fair or just. But the needs of oth, 
ers will not alone determine what action is right. What we are able to 
do will also play an integral role in determining what is right or 
wrong.22 We might go so far as to say that ethics is not only a matter 
of right and wrong, but also a matter of ability. Or, to say this in 
another way, what is right or wrong wiU be determined in part by 
strength and weakness. Ethics will be a matter of character. At least, 
we will not be able to understand the nature of ethics fully without 
considering the character of the individual. 
This way of talking about ethics reminds me of Nietzsche. We 
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mi.ghc call ic (an echic of caring) an echic char goe5 beyond right and 
wrong. The issues of ethics are not issues of deciding what is right or 
wrong, alchough we have some guidelines for what consequences we 
would like to see. The issues of ethics are those of the extent to which 
we can (or others can) contribute to the desirable consequences. 
Rightness, then, is doing what you are able. Everyone who has done 
his or her best has done what is right, has done all that we can expect 
of him or her, even if the consequences are not as desirable as those 
achieved by someone else. This way of talking about things ensures 
that persons have intrinsic value; i.e., they are not just valued for what 
they contribute to the fulfillment of our desires (even if our desires 
are sometimes for the happiness of others). And, at least, the ques­
tions of ethics include how I can become stronger, less afraid, wiser, 
and so on and how I can help others become stronger, wiser, less 
afraid, etc. 
Finally, one other way to distinguish an ethic of caring from an 
ethic of utility is to note that an ethic of utility is an ethic of obliga­
tion while an ethic of caring is an ethic without obligation. This way 
of putting things sounds odd because we think of ethics as having to 
do with obligation, as telling us what our obligations are. Why should 
I act in one way rather than another? Because I ought to (or I have an 
obligation to act in a particular way). We ought to do what is right 
just .because it is right. But the talk about caring suggests that we act as 
we do because we wane to, and not because we have to, not because it 
is right. Acting "rightly" for an ethic of caring means doing what is 
11right" because one wants to and not because one is obligated to so 
act. Insofar as we can make sense of this distinction between acting 
out of obligation and acting out of desire, it seems to me to be a dis­
tinction which separates an ethic of caring from an ethic of utility. 
Indeed, it shows that an ethic of caring is radically different from an 
ethic of utility.23 
One thing that this distinction points out is that the life of someone 
who adopts an ethic of caring will be quite different from the life of 
someone who focuses upon obligation, duty, rights, etc. That is, life is 
experienced as very different from the perspective of caring. Life feels 
different from the perspective of caring. Indeed, I would suggest that 
one would find the life of caring attractive just because of the damage 
that is done to us by living a life of obligation, justice, duty, or even a 
life in which everything is structured around rights. Duty. rights, and 
justice are often mechanisms for controlling other people and when 
these notions are applied to us we feel controlled. It may be that talk 
about caring is designed to overcome the disa.dvantages to us of struc­
turing our lives in accordance with traditional moral views. 24 
My hope is to have offered some descriptions which will help us to 
recognize a difference between an ethic of carii.ng and an ethic of util­
ity. My sense of this difference is that it is a radical one, so radical, in 
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fact. that it causes us to talk about the nature of ethics in two very dif­
ferent ways. If an, ethic of caring will count as an ethic at all. then the 
nature of ethics will be very different from the nature of ethics where 
ethics is limited to the traditional moral theories. In order to support 
the idea that there are two quite different ways of talking about the 
nature of ethics, one of which is suggested by the way in which 
women talk about moral problems. permit me now to turn to a 
further distinguishing characteristic. 
VI 
There is another way to distinguish an ethic of caring from both an 
ethic of utility and an ethic of principle. The ethics of both utility and 
principle are examples of formal rationalism. An ethic of caring is not. 
What distinguishes caring from utility or principle is the notion of 
reason that governs each ethic. 
Let me begin by examining the nature of formal rationality. Histori­
cally speaking, formal rationality arises with the advent of modern 
philosophy and science, with Descartes and Newton. Its use has con­
tinued through the period of positivism and into the present age of 
technology and the computer.Zs Formal rationality is characterized by 
the existence of one demonstrably correct answer to any of our ques­
tions. If we adopt formal rationality, then we can prove things­
beyond a shadow of a doubt. There is a hierarchy of rules or princi­
ples to which we can appeal in cases of dispute, rules or principles 
which will settle the issue. Formal rationality avoids the problems of 
relativism and may have arisen in response to the "anything goes" 
relativism of the previous ages. Mathematics, logic, and the computer 
serve as models for formal rationality. Indeed, Descartes envisioned 
himself as constructing a geometry of knowledge. If our ideas are not 
susceptible to such organization and calculation, then they will not 
count as knowledge and our claims will be labeled irrational. 
Now, both utilitarianism and an ethic of principles or justice are 
dependent upon the notion of formal rationality. That. is, both utility 
and justice are efforts to provide a moral theory which meets the 
requirements of formal rationality. 26 Both kinds of theory are 
designed to provide a mechanism by which we can arrive at a correct 
answer to the question of how we should behave, an answer which 
can be demonstrated or proven to anyone who understands the hie­
rarchy and calculations of each moral theory. The methods of utility 
and justice are very much like that of the digital computer. That is, 
they decide between one choice or another until all of the calculations 
have been made. If the rules are followed at each step (if the proce­
dure is carried out correctly), we can be assured that our answer is 
correct. 
By contrast, an ethic of caring does not depend upon the notion of 
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formal rationality. We cannot arrive at an answer by following a set of 
rules. In some cases one feature will be the determining factor and in 
other cases some other features will carry the day. What tells us 
which feature will be the determining factor or which features will 
receive what weights, will be a matter of what we often call "judg­
ment." That is, from within a given situation, we will recognize 
immediately the \'alues involved and which features will determine the 
right action. We cannot predict the outcome in advance. nor can we 
discover the outcome by following rules of procedure. We cannot 
prove our conclusions, we can only recognize them. 
Now, the picture of rationality I have sketched very briefly. what I 
will call "informal rationality," is generally taken to be a picture of 
irrationality, but this is only because we are so used to describing 
rationality in terms of formal rationality. If, however, we can utilize a 
notion of informal rationality, then we can distinguish one moral the­
ory from its competitors on the basis of the kind of rationality which 
underlies the moral theory. We will have different moral theories 
with their accompanying notions of rationality rather than rational 
moral theories versus those that are irrational. We may also decide 
that one notion of rationality is better than another and thereby pro­
vide support for selecting one moral theory over others. 
There is , of course, much to be said regarding the nature of ration­
ality. On behalf of informal rationality, however, let me just say that 
what we have discovered recently about the way the brain works sug­
gests that the notion of informal rationality more accurately reflects 
the way in which we actually do think, not only about moral prob­
lems, but about the world around us. The brain does not work like a 
digital computer (or, where it does its application is severely limited ). 
The brain seems to carry out the function we commonly call "judg­
ment," a function we are not able to program the computer to carry 
out. How the brain does this, we do not know, but we do know that 
the brain does generate order without recourse to rules. We can say, 
then, on behalf of informal rationality, that it better describes the way 
in which the human brain actually does work.27 
I have been trying to distinguish an ethic of caring from ethical the­
ories based on utility or justice. In this section I have tried to show 
that an ethic of utility or justice is based upon a notion of formal 
rationality and that an ethic of caring is a different kind of theory 
because it is founded upon a notion of informal rationality. If this dis­
tinction makes sense, then the disadvantage of moral theories based 
upon formal rationality is that they are limited in their scope of appli­
cation, just as formal rationality is itself limited in its scope. We can 
force, of course, the application of formal theories, but this practice 
will not do justice to our experience. If we turn to theories that cover 
a wider range of cases, however, we face a different disadvantage. That 
is, the flexibility we achieve in an ethic of caring, the very flexibility 
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which enables us to cover a wider range of experience. is subject to 
abuse. If we recognize the values of a situation an determining nght 
and wrong. different people can claim to recogn izt' different values 
and the tools of proof which might otherwise be used to settle lSsues 
of right and wrong are no longer available to us. This brings us once 
again to the question of relativism. 2"  
VII 
Much remains to be said about the issues we have considered so far, 
but we must now turn to the question of relativism. This issue was 
raised originally by Carol Gilligan's claim that the perspective of 
women is not inferior to that of men. It is an issue 1that has continued 
to surface throughout our discussion. At this point we are considering 
the possibility that the way in which women talk about moral prob­
lems suggests a different moral theory ( an ethic of caring) from tradi­
tional theories of principle or justice and utility. If an ethic of caring is 
not inferior to an ethic of principle or an ethic of utility, then it may 
be equal to or superior to such ethics. We must now consider each of 
these possibilities. 
If an ethic of caring is equal to an ethic of justice, for example, then 
an ethic of caring may tell us that X is the right thing to do and an 
ethic of justice may tell us that X is the wrong thing to do and both 
theories will be correct. X will be both right and wrong. And this is 
the basic problem of relativism. Whether we do X or not will be rela­
tive to the moral theory we have adopted and we do not have any 
good reasons for adopting an ethic of justice over an ethic of caring or 
vice versa. 
Here we have relativism at the most fundamental level. We have no 
good reason for choosing one moral theory over another 1 and yet one 
moral theory tells us X is right and another tells us X is wrong. How 
will we know what to do? The answer is that we will not know what 
to do. We will not have any good reason for choosing X or for avoid­
ing X .  Since adopting moral theories is arbitrary, making moral deci­
sions based on those moral theories will also be arbitrary. This seems 
to me to make the business of ethics irrational, even if we utilize a 
broader notion of rationality than is common. 
The response to relativism that I sometimes hear is that we need 
both an ethic of caring and an ethic of, for example, justice. w.e will 
simply recognize that an ethic of caring better suits a particular situa­
tion than an ethic of justice or vice versa. But this response misses the 
point that an ethic of caring is different from an ethic of justice (or 
utility). That is, an ethic of caring already says that considerations of 
justice will sometimes outweigh considerations of happiness and vice 
versa. Indeed, this is just where relativism does enter our moral con, 
siderations. But an ethic of justice says that considerations of justice 
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will always decide what is right or wrong. There is a conflict berween 
an ethic of caring and an ethic of justice. The choice here is not 
between justice and happiness (that choice resides within an ethic of 
caring) but between an ethic that includes hoch considerations of jus­
tice and happiness and an ethic that includes onl�· considerations of 
justice or an ethic that includes onl�· considerations of happiness. 
At the level of moral theory (given that one theory includes fea­
tures of the other rwo ). then, to say that an ethic of caring is equal to 
an ethic of justice is to generate a fundamental relativism, a relativism 
that makes it impossible to decide how we should behave .If caring is 
equal to justice. then ethics will be a matter o f  choosing and commit­
ment in the existential tradition, rather than a matter of reason. The 
relativism within an ethic ofcaring, by contrast, does offer a mecha­
nism for deciding what we should do-the recognition of values. This 
mechanism may not always give us easy answers, but it is available 
within an ethic o f  caring as it is not for settling disputes between an 
ethic of caring and an ethic of justice. This is a very significant conse­
quence of saying that the ethical perspective of women is not inferior 
ro that of men where this means that an ethic of caring is equal to an 
ethic of justice. But since this consequence is a negative one, that is, it 
prevents us from having reasons for choosing actions as right or 
wrong, we will be well served to explore the other alternative, that an 
ethic of caring is superior to an ethic of justice or an ethic of utility. 
It seems to me that ethical theories have a purpose. Like knowledge 
in general, ethical theories have survival value.29 Given the capacity of 
the human species to imagine many alternative behaviors, we need a 
way of arranging our choices in some order. Otherwise we will be 
overwhelmed by the possibilities available to us. The order we give 
our choices may be the strict hierarchy of a principle of justice or the 
loose arrangement suggested by an ethic of caring. But the purpose of 
moral theories is to give order to our alternative behaviors and this 
order has survival value. 
If this is a plausible account of moral theories, then we can say that 
one moral theory will be better than another if its survival value is 
greater. Given that moral theories have a purpose, the best moral the­
ory will be the one that best fulfills its purpose. We now have a 
standard by which to judge moral theories, a mechanism by which to 
select one moral theory over others. 
Now, if we adopt this standard for measuring moral theories, it 
seems to me that we can make a case in favor of an ethic of caring 
over an ethic of justice or an ethic of utility. That is, we can argue that 
an ethic of caring has greater survival value than other moral theories. 
In so doing we will be able to avoid the fundamental relativism that 
accompanies the equality of caring and justice or utility. 
The case in favor of an ethic of caring rests primarily upon its flexi­
bility. That is, since an ethic of caring can utilize both considerations 
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of justice and of utility it has the advantage of telling us how to 
behave in a wider range of cases than either an ethic of only justice or 
only utility. 30 Since the range of our experiences does not lend itself 
to only justice or only utility, if we are to have order among our 
alternative behaviors, we will have to find some other theory and an 
ethic of caring does seems to be available in those cases to which the 
application of justice or utility seems forced or arbitrary. This is, 
indeed, how we generally view deontological and consequentialist 
theories. Both theories have difficulties and we continually revise 
them in order to resolve these difficulties. And those revisions are 
often designed to accommodate features recognized by the other kind 
of theory. Accommodating elements of both theories is exactly what 
an ethic of caring does. 
There is a qualification to the view that an ethic of caring has 
greater survival value than other moral theories. We must consider 
this qualification in order to see the complete picture regarding the 
superiority of an ethic of caring. An eth:ic of caring is not for eve­
ryone. That is, at some stages of development, individual members of 
the species are unable to cope with a wide range of experience. Indi­
viduals wiU require simplification rather than complexity. Children 
need rules and guidelines rather than more possibilities. BasicaUy, util­
izing an ethic of caring is only for those who have reached a stage of 
development that enables them to deal with the real world-the world 
of complexity and ambiguity. 
What this qualification suggests is that it is an im.portant part of 
ethics to help people develop the skills that are required for living in a 
complex world. We return to the notion of strength that is so impor­
tant to the notion of caring. Here we have another consideration in 
making moral decisions-how our behavior effects the maturity of 
others. The idea of virtue becomes as important as the idea of right­
ness within the general framework of moral considerations. 
VIII 
I have examined three possible interpretations of Carol Gilligan's 
claims that women have a different perspective on moral problems 
and that this perspective is not inferior to the perspective of men. It 
seems to me that the third interpretation is dearly the most significant 
for moral theory, although the other interpretations offer important 
insights into our understanding of how we ought to behave. The third 
interpretation is that the way in which women talk about moral prob­
lems suggests a different moral theory, one that is different from tra­
ditional deontological theories or utilitarian theories. I have tried to 
make a case for there being a different theory. 
Additionally, if this ethical theory (an ethic of caring) is not infe­
rior to traditional mor.al theories then it must be equal to or better 
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than traditional moral theories. If an ethic of caring is only equal to 
rradirional moral theories, then we will be involved in a fundamental 
relativism that prevents us from having reasons for acting in one way 
rather than another. The alternative is that an ethic of caring is better 
than traditional moral theories because it is a theory that applies to a 
greater range of our experience. This flexibility gives an ethic of caring 
greater survival value than other moral theories. But, survival depends 
not only upon a moral theory but also upon being able to utilize that 
theory. What we need to encourage in our behavior, then, is not only 
an ethic of caring but also the kind of person, whether in ourselves or 
others, that can utilize an ethic of caring. 
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giving relationships a formal character, while women see relationships as infor­
mal (personalr). l( this other way of viewing relationship is correct, however, it 
seems to me that what l want to say at this point in the paper can still be said, 
but it will have to be translated into the language of the new way of viewing 
relationship. 
& One might introduce an argument regarding the happiness that li'esults from 
autonomy rather than dependence, but without such an argument we have no 
reason to believe that women or their values are, inferior. Indeed. we might 
respond to the argument above by showing that more happiness results from 
relationship than from separateness. 
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9 TM- a.a� can be Uld for ch1ldrt'n whC'rt' c htlJren art' quilt" unhkC' malt" aJults. 
ic Stt In A 01ffttreru Voice. p. 8. and Th.: Rc."p1oJw..t1on of M0th..'T1n.1;. r· 167 . 
1 1  Worntn may draw this dist1nct1on on the basis of their expent'nces without t"Vct 
having tnd any of the popular books on parennng. 
11 Thi.6 matehn rhe disonction consad�ed t>arlier bcf,.·een relanonship as personal 
or informal and rdationship as formal or contractarian. See Note 7. 
, ,  �e Nel Noddings, Carin�: A Fem1n1ne Aprnoach To Erlu • ·s And Moral Edk«.1Uon, 
Bttkclry, Univcrsiry of California Press. 1984. The perspecuve I am describing 
hne i1 also called an rthk of respon�. I have no quarrel with that description. 
14 It may be that the key here is that there arc two notions of "unsdfishness." one 
notion in which unsdfishncss means sacrifice and one in which it means expn:s­
sion. The first notion (sacrifice) is a very popular one, but it seems to me that 
this notion of unse-lfishness is often used to manipulate others. The second 
notion (expression) �ems much less likely to be used to manipulate others and 
thttefore has an advantagie over the first. 
" Noddings, p. 185. 
16 Noddinp, p. 1 1  7. 
17 It may be unfair to have an either/or result, but I think that the example will be 
helpful and I do not lcnow how to explore all of the alternatives in the space 
permitted. 
18 We do not want to make the difficulty of calculation a factor here. I( we calcu­
late preciacly and correctly that the happiness of the life of the child will be 
greater than the unhappiness of the mother, we still want to say that on an ethic 
of caring the woman should have an abortion. 
19 William K. Frankcna, Ethics, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963. For a 
similar des<:ription of an ethical theory sec Walter Kaufmann, The Faich of a 
Heretic, Garden City, Doubleday, 1961 .  
zo There are many things, it seems to me, that arc very important but abou.t which 
we cannot be very preciac. The trend of modern thought, however, following the 
pattern of modern science, is to say that if we cannot be precise about something 
that it cannot be very important. This trend seems to me to be exemplified in the 
case of the computer. "If we cannoc pw it on the computer it cannot be very impor· 
uuu. Wharaier we can pw on the computer mu.st be 4>erJ important." I want to resist 
this. trend as much as possible. By the way, the fact that we cannot speak pre, 
cisely about something does not mean that anything we s:ay about it is correct. 
That is, imprecision docs not generate relativism. (This is one of the major 
them� of the ethics of women, as 1 understand this pers�tive. )  
21 Thi:s seems to me to be one of the themes in Bernard Williams' recent book, 
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1985. 
22 Thi:s seems to me to introduce an element of relativism, but does not suggest 
that anything goes. 
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: > It also dcmonstratt"S a radical diff('ttOC(' bttwttn an ('thic of \."Iring and an (thic 
of duty or justice or pnnc1ple. That is. what has �n said about t� distinction 
Jxt'Attn an ethic o( caring and an t"thk of utility can � said ab<;>ut the disrinc­
non bt•twttn an nhic of cari ng and any dC'Ontological theory. 
:• � might. I suppose. arg� that this is a version of rule utilituianism. That is, 
at any given moment "''e may not bring about the greatest happi�. but ovierall 
"''e will do so. 
:� Some philosophtts have spoken out against formal rationality. including 
Niensche, Hegel, Sarttt, �wqr. and Wittgen$tein. 
!& For an utensive discussion of this i� see Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue: A 
Study in Moral Theory, No� Dame, University of Nottt Dame Press. 1981. 
n A number of authors writing on ethics have bttn concerned with the notion of 
rationality. Stt Williams and Macintyre, but also Edmund L. Pincoffs, Quandrin 
and VirtMe.s: A.11ain.st Redwctivism in Echia, Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 
1986; and, Stephen Toulmin. Tht Place of Reason in Ethics, Chicago, The Uni· 
versity of Chicago Press, 1986 (first published in 1950); and, Walrrr Kaufmann. 
Wit.hour Guill and ]wtice. New York, Pettr H. Wyden. lnc., 1973. For an account 
of rationality not connected wi th ethics sec Gonzalo Munevar, Radical Knou�­
MRt. lndianaix>lis, Hackett Publishing Company, 1981;  and Richard Rorty. Phi· 
losoph1 and rite Mirror of Nanc're, Princeton, Princeton University PttSS, 1979; 
Harry Redner, The End.J of Pnilosoph1. London, Croom Helm, 1986; and W. 
Boyd Limell. Bam�awcraric Ju.nice, Beverly Hills, S.� Publications, 1979. 
is 1 intend to be following in ethics what my colleague Gonzalo Muncvar claims 
applies to knowledge in general. See Radical Kn"'4il«il{e. 
ZQ We can make, of course, any ethic work in every case by merely insisting that 
the answer it gives is the corttct one. But in many instances the answer a theory 
gi ves us does not seem appropriate to the siruation, for example, when acting 
justly causes great unhappiness for everyone involved. 
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